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Atkinson, II: Constitutional Law - Article III: A Clear Test for the Constituti

CASE NOTES

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-Article IIl: A Clear Test for the Constitutionality of
Non-Article III Courts. Northern Pipeline Construction Co. v. Marathon
-,
102 S.Ct. 2858 (1982).
Pipe Line Co.,
U.S.

Northern Pipeline Construction Company (Northern)
filed suit against Marathon Pipe Line Company (Marathon)
on March 8, 1979 in the United States District Court for
the Western District of Kentucky.' Northern sought damages for alleged breach of contract, breach of warranty,
misrepresentation, coercion, and duress.2 In January 1980,
Northern filed a petition for reorganization under chapter
11 in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District
of Minnesota and in March 1980, pursuant to the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978,1 Northern filed suit against
Marathon in that court, claiming the same damages as in
the prior action.4 Marathon moved for dismissal of the suit
on the grounds that the Bankruptcy Reform Act was unconstitutional because it granted article III judicial powers to
judges who do not have life tenure and protection against
salary diminution.5 At this point, the United States interCopyright© 1983 by the University of Wyoming.

1. Brief for Appellee at 2, Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe
Line Co., ... U.S-

-----,102

S.Ct. 2858 (1982).

2. Id.
3. 28 U.S.C. § 1471 (Supp. IV 1980). This section reads as follows:
(a) Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, the district
courts shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction of all cases under
title 11.
(b) Notwithstanding any Act of Congress that confers exclusive jurisdiction on a court or courts other than the district courts, the district
courts shall have original but not exclusive jurisdiction of all civil proceedings arising under title 11 or arising in or related to cases under
title 11.
(c) The bankruptcy court for the district in which a case under title
11 is commenced shall exercise all of the jurisdiction conferred by this
section on the district courts.
(d) Subsection (b) or (c) or this section does not prevent a district
court or a bankruptcy court, in the interest of justice, from abstaining
from hearing a particular proceeding arising under title 11 or arising
in or related to a case under title 11. Such abstention, or a decision not
to abstain, is not reviewable by appeal or otherwise.
(e) The bankruptcy court in which a case under title 11 is commenced
shall have exclusive jurisdiction of all of the property, wherever located, of the debtor, as of the commencement of such case.
4. Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 102 S.Ct. at 2864
(1982).
5. Id. at 2864. Article III, section 1 of the Constitution reads:
The judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in one
supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from
time to time ordain and establish. The Judges, both of the supreme
and inferior Courts, shall hold their Offices during good Behavior, and
shall, at stated Times, receive for their Services a Compensation, which
shall not be diminished during their Continuance in Office.
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vened to defend the statute's validity.' The bankruptcy
court denied the motion to dismiss, whereupon Marathon
appealed to the District Court.7 The District Court granted
the motion, reasoning that the grant of power in the Bankruptcy Reform Act to bankruptcy judges is unconstitutional
because they are not article III judges.' Northern appealed
to the United States Supreme Court. The Court noted probable jurisdiction and handed down its decision in Northern
Pipeline ConstructionCo. v. MarathonPipe Line Co. on June
28, 1982.10
The Court found that, as a general proposition, all matters requiring the exercise of the judicial power of the
United States must be adjudicated by an independent judiciary as established by the article III requirements of life
tenure and protection against salary diminution. 1 The
Court identified three exceptions to this general proposition:
territorial courts, courts-martial, and legislative courts and
administrative agencies created by Congress to adjudicate
cases involving public rights. 2
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND-DEVELOPMENT

OF THE

NON-ARTICLE III COURT DOCTRINE

The historical development of the doctrine by which
article III courts are distinguished from non-article III
courts is best traced by looking to those decisions in which
the Court has held that the requirements of article III need
not be met. A basic proposition of constitutional law, accepted by the Northern Pipeline Court, is that an independent judiciary, established as such by the protections of article III, must be the only body to exercise the judicial power
of the United States in the absence of exceptional circumstances.'" These "exceptional circumstances" consist of three
basic categories. First, in American Insurance Co. v. Can6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.

102 S.Ct. at 2864.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 2858.
Id. at 2879-80.
Id. at 2868-71.
Id. at 2865.
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ter, 4 the Court recognized that Congress may establish courts
which do not conform to article III in territories not within
the States comprising the United States.15 Second, the Court
in Dynes v. Hoover 6 held that Congress may constitute
courts-martial to try military and naval offences without
adherence to the requirments of article III.1" Finally, in
Murray's Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 8 the
Court formulated the doctrine which states that public rights
matters, while capable of judicial review, may be removed
from the cognizance of the courts of the United States as
Congress sees fit." The bases and ambit of these exceptions
will be more fully discussed in the portion of this note describing the Court's decision in Northern Pipeline.
One further case deserves explanation: Palmore v.
United States."° This recent decision was perhaps the leading case in the are of article III court requirements prior to
Northern Pipeline. Furthermore, seven of the justices who
decided Northern Pipeline also participated in deciding Palmore.2 The Court in Palmore held that Congress may
establish non-article III courts in the District of Columbia
to try felony cases under the provisions of the District of
Columbia Code.22 The basis for the Palmore decision is in
dispute. The plurality in Northern Pipeline read the case
as standing for the proposition that Congress may create
non-article III courts to adjudicate matters arising in the
District of Columbia, pursuant to its power to govern territories of the United States not within any State. -3 In the
dissent, Justice White contended that the decision did not
rest on the theory of territorial control, but "on an evaluation
26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 511 (1828).
Id. at 546.
61 U.S. (20 How.) 65 (1858).
Id. at 79.
59 U.S. (18 How.) 272 (1856).
Id. at 284.
411 U.S. 389 (1973).
Id. The Justices praticipating in the decision were White, Burger, Stewart,
Marshall, Blackmun, Powell, Rehnquist, and Douglas. All except Stewart
and Douglas participated in the Northern Pipeline decision.
22. 411 U.S. at 408-10.
23. 102 S.Ct. at 2868.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
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of the strength of the legislative interest in pursuing . . .
one of its constitutionally assigned responsibilities.12 4

The state of the law in this area after the Palmore decision can only be described as one of confusion. When considering passage of the Bankruptcy Reform Act, the House
of Representatives requested analysis of the very question
involved in this case from some of the country's leading constitutional law scholars.25 The positions taken by these scholars on the question were by no means consistent and several
mentioned the uncertainty of this area of the law.2"
The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978
The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 was enacted by
The Act made
Congress after extensive consideration.
sweeping changes in both the procedural and substantive
law of bankruptcy." Those changes included elimination of
the well-known referee system in favor of United States
Bankruptcy Courts created as adjuncts of each district
court.2" Of particular significance to the issues involved in
this case, the Act provided that the judges of the courts
would be appointed by the President to 14-year terms.3 0 The
new judges were to be paid salaries set by statute, subject to
adjustment."'
Also of significance to this case, the Court noted that,
under the act, the powers of the bankruptcy judges are very
24. Id. at 2894 (White, J., dissenting).

See generally Krattenmaker, Article

II and Judicial Independence: Why the New Bankruptcy Courts are Unconstitutional, 70 GEO. L.J. 297 (discussing six factors identified by the
Court in Palmore which the author believed could help in predicting whether
the bankruptcy courts would eventually be held constitutional).

25. H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 63-87 (1978), reprinted in 1978
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 5963, 6023-49. Among those who responded to
the request were Thomas G. Krattenmaker, Georgetown University Law
Center; Jo Desha Lucas, University of Chicago Law School; Paul J. Mishkin, University of California; David L. Shapiro, Harvard Law School; and
Charles Alan Wright, University of Texas at Austin.
26. Id.
27. Klee, Legislative History of the New Bankruptcy Law, 28 DE PAUL L. REv.
941, 942-57 (1979).
28. Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 102 S.Ct. at 2862
(1982).
29. 28 U.S.C. § 151(a) (Supp. IV 1980).
30. 28 U.S.C. §§ 152, 153(a) (Supp. IV 1980).
31. 28 U.S.C. § 154 (Supp. IV 1980).
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broad." They are given all of the "powers of a court of
equity, law and admiralty."" The only exceptions to these
powers are that the bankruptcy judges "may not enjoin
another court or punish a criminal contempt not committed
in the presence of the judge of the court or warranting a
punishment of imprisonment." 4 The Court also stated 5 that
Congress has allowed bankruptcy judges to conduct jury
trials," issue declaratory judgments, 7 issue writs of habeas
corpus in certain circumstances," issue any other writs necessary,3" and issue any other order, process or judgment necessary or appropriate to carry out the provisions of title 11.40
As noted by Justice White in the dissent, however, these
powers are arguably not much broader than those exercised
by bankruptcy referees.4 Under the previous bankruptcy
provisions, the bankruptcy referees had the authority to
adjudicate all petitions referred to them, rule on discharges
and determine the dischargeability of debts.2 They also decided on the allowance and disallowance of claims. 3
In addition to the Act's broad grant of power, it also
gives much broader jurisdiction to the bankruptcy courts
than was exercised by the referee system.44 The district
courts are given original jurisdiction over "all civil proceedings arising under title 11 or arising in or related to cases
under title 11." ' The bankruptcy courts are granted all of
the jurisdiction conferred on the district courts over title 11
matters." The jursidiction thus given to the bankruptcy
courts includes matters not traditionally associated with
bankruptcy proceedings and includes the power to decide
32. 102 S.Ct. at 2863.
33. 28 U.S.C. § 1481 (Supp. IV 1980).
34. 28 U.S.C. § 1481 (Supp. IV 1980).
35. 102 S.Ct. at 2863.
36. 28 U.S.C. § 1480 (Supp. IV 1980).
37. 28 U.S.C. § 2201 (Supp. IV 1980).
38. 28 U.S.C. § 2256 (Supp. IV 1980).
39. 28 U.S.C. § 1651 (1976).
40. 11 U.S.C. § 105 (Supp. IV 1980).
41. 102 S.Ct. at 2885-86 (White, J., dissenting).
42. 11 U.S.C. § 66 (1976).
43. Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 102 S.Ct. at 288586 (1982) (White, J., dissenting).
44. Id. at 2862-63.
45. 28 U.S.C. § 1471(b) (Supp. IV 1980).
46. 28 U.S&C. § 1471(c) (Supp. IV 1980).
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suits to recover accounts, actions concerning exempt property, attempts to avoid transfers and payments as preferences or fraudulent conveyances, and causes of action owned
by the debtor at the time of the petition for bankruptcy.4 7
Claims based on state law are also included in the Act's grant
of jurisdiction.4
The inclusion of state law questions is accomplished by
allowing the courts to consider "related" claims based on
state law. This great expansion of jurisdiction was certainly
not without justification. Under the former system, certain
disputes which were determinative of the bankrupt's ability
to start anew were outside the referee's jurisdiction and thus
not under his control."' Clearly, outstanding claims of creditors against the bankrupt or claims of the bankrupt against
third parties have a direct impact on the financial position
of the bankrupt. If left unresolved, the discharge granted
by the bankruptcy court in some cases would have little
meaning.
Appeals from orders of the bankruptcy court were also
affected by the Act. Three avenues of appeal now exist."0 The
first possible route is to a panel of three bankruptcy judges,
provided such a panel is created by the circuit council."1
Second, the appeal may be taken to the United States district
courts in the absence of these panels.2 Finally, the parties
may, by agreement, take the appeal directly to the court of
appeals."3
47. Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 102 S.Ct. at 286263 (1982).
48. Id. at 2863. See also 1 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY
3.01 (e) (2), at 3-48 (15th
ed. 1981) [hereinafter cited as COLLIER]. The Court also noted that, while
the Act does not explicitly indicate the extent to which personal jurisdiction may be exercised by bankruptcy judges, it has been construed to be
the maximum extent constitutionally allowable. 102 S.Ct. at 2863 n. 4.
49. 1 COLLIER, supra note 48, at 3.01(e) (2), at 3-48.
50. Id. at
3.03(b) (ii), at 3-226.
51. 28 U.S.C. § 160 (Supp. IV 1980).
52. 28 U.S.C. § 1334 (Supp. IV 1980).
53. 28 U.S.C. § 1293(b) (Supp. IV 1980). The Court noted that the Act does
not specify the standard of appellate review and reiterated the position of
the parties in this case that the appropriate standard is the "clearly erroneous" one without commenting on the validity of this position. 102 S.Ct.
at 263 n.5. See also 1 COLLIER, sup.ra note 48, at 3.03, at 3-315.
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THE COURT'S ANALYSIS

The impact of this case does not lie in the specific holding that the "Bankruptcy Act of 1978 has impermissibly
removed most, if not all, of the 'essential attributes of the
judicial power' from the Art. III district court, and has vested those attributes in a non-Art. III adjunct." 4 Congress will
eventually pass legislation to remedy the defects identified by
the Court.?5 The case's import is rather in the clear analysis
developed by the Court for determining whether a given
court must possess all the attributes required by article III.
When considering the Court's analysis, it must be noted
that it was developed by a plurality rather than a majority.
Justice Rehnquist and Justice O'Conner concurred in the
result of the case but did not subscribe to the analysis used
either by the plurality or by the dissent.5" They instead refused to address the broad question defined as the issue by
the plurality." The concurring Justices would have held unconstitutional only so much of the Act as was required to confer jurisdiction on the Bankruptcy Court over Northern's
state law-based claim." Because they found that this part
of the jurisdictional grant was "not readily severable" from
the remainder, they concurred in the judgment of the
plurality."
54. 102 S.Ct. at 2879-80.
55. Id. at 2882 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). After deciding the grant of jurisdiction was unconstitutional, the Court considered whether the decision
should be applied retroactively. Because the issue in the case presented
an unprecedented question of interpretation of article III, and because
retroactive application would not further the operation of the holding and
would cause substantial hardships on litigants who relied on the grant of
jurisdiction, the Court held that the decision should apply only prospectively.
The Court then stayed its judgment until October 4, 1982, to give Congress
the opportunity to remedy the defects. Id. at 2880. The Court later extended the stay of judgment until December 24, 1982, on motion of the
Solicitor General. Order Extending Stay of Judgment, 51 U.S.L.W. 3259
(U.S. Oct. 15, 1982) (No. 81-546). On December 23, 1982, the Court refused to further extend the stay. The Northern Pipeline judgment took
effect as of December 25, 1982. Order Denying Extension of Stay of Judgment, 51 U.S.L.W. 3475 (U.S. Jan. 4, 1983) ( No. 81-150, No. 81-546).
56. 102 S.Ct. at 2880 (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
57. Id. at 2882 (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
58. Id.
59. Id,
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Basis of Analysis: Separation of Powers
The Court began its analysis in Northern Pipeline by
noting the overriding historical importance of the separation
of powers doctrine. The plurality saw article III as an essential ingredient in the constitutional formula for a system of
checks and balances whereby judicial impartiality is guaranteed, judicial power is defined, and the independence of the
Judicial Branch is protected."0 In United States v. Will,"' the
Court stressed the importance of a judiciary free from control by the other branches of government."2 The "inexorable
command" of article III is that only courts possessing the
attributes prescribed by article III may exercise the judicial
power of the United States."
Article III requires that judges of courts exercising the
judicial power of the United States be given life tenure, subject only to impeachment, 4 and that they receive a fixed
compensation for their services. " These requirements have
as their aim the creation of a judiciary not subject to the
control of the Executive and Legislative Branches. The inclusion of these requirements may be traced to one of the
factors leading to the Revolutionary War. The Declaration
of Independence stated that one of the wrongs committed by
the King of Great Britain was making the "judges dependent on his will alone, for the tenure of their offices, and the
amount and payment of their salaries."0 0 The Northern
Pipeline Court concluded'that the Constitution "unambiguously" requires exercise of the judicial power by an independent judiciary and that "[ilt commands that the independence of the Judiciary be jealously guarded." '
The Exceptions
Considering only the rather narrow question of whether
the bankruptcy courts were constitutionally created as non60.
61.
62.
63.

Id. at 2865.
449 U.S. 200 (1980).
Id. at 217-18.
Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 102 S.Ct. at 2865
(1982).
64. Toth-v. Quarles, 850 U.S. 11, 16 (1955).
65. United States v. Will, 449 U.S. at 218-21 (1980).
66. O'Donoghue v. United States, 289 U.S. 516, 531 (1933) (quoting DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE, In Congress, July 4, 1776).

67. 102 S.Ct. at 2866.
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article III courts, the Court embarked on a broad analysis
of the acceptable categories of non-article III courts. The
three categories recognized by the Court as exceptions to the

general rule are territorial courts, military courts-martial,
and Congressionally-created legislative courts and administrative bodies empowered to adjudicate "public rights issues."
1) TerritorialCourts. Courts constituted to exercise judicial power in the territories of the United States were required from the formation of the country. Congress was held
to have the authority to create courts independent of the
requirements of article III as a result of the "general powers
of government" given to it by article IV."s
2) Courts-Martial. The second category of courts not
required to adhere to article III are those courts created by
the Executive and Legislative Branches pursuant to their
power to establish and administer military courts-martial."
This power is derived from article I, section eight, clauses 13
and 14 of the Constitution and has never been seriously questioned. 0 Regarding the establishment of these courts, the
Court has held that Congress has both the power to establish
68. Id. at 2868. The seminal case in this area was American Ins. Co. v. Canter,
which held that the Florida territorial courts were constitutional, even
though the judges were appointed for only four years. 26 U.S. (1 Pet.)
at 546. The Court observed that "[w]hichever may be the source whence
the power (of Congress to govern a territory) is derived, the possession of
it is unquestioned." Id. at 542. This proposition was reaffirmed in Palmore
v. United States, wherein the Court stated that Coneress may, in all cases,
exercise exclusive jurisdiction over the District of Columbia. 411 U.S. at
397. The Court thus implicitly recognized that Congress' power to govern
the District of Columbia is derived from article IV as well as from article I.
Article I, section 8, clause 17 of the Constitution gives Congress the
power:
To exercise exclusive Legislation in all Cases whatsoever, over such
District (not exceeding ten Miles square) as may, by Cession of particular States, and the Acceptance of Congress, become the Seat of
Government of the United States, and to exercise like Authority over
all Places purchased by the Consent of the Legislature of the State in
which the Same shall be, for the Erection of Forts, Magazines, Arsenals, dock-Yards, and other needful Buildings.
Article IV, section 3,clause 2 of the Constitution reads:
The Congress shall have Power to dispose of and make all needful
Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory or other Property belonging to the United States; and nothing in this Constitution shall be
so construed as to Prejudice any Claims of the United States, or of any
particular State.
69. Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 102 S.Ct. at 286869 (1982).
70. Id. at 2869. Article I, section 8, clauses 13 and 14 give Congress the power
"(13) To provide and maintain a Navy; (14) To make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land and naval Forces."
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these courts to provide for the punishment of military offences and the power to establish them without any regard
for article III.71
3) Adjudication of "Public Rights" Matters. The final
category of permissible non-article III courts includes legislative courts and administrative agencies created by Congress to adjudicate cases involving so-called "public rights. 72
Obviously, this category is the only one among the three exceptions that provides for the possible inclusion of bankruptcy courts.
The first mention of the public rights doctrine was
made in Murray's Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement
Co., wherein the Court stated that matters involving public
rights, even though susceptible to judicial determination,
may be kept from the cognizance of the courts of the United
States if Congress So desires. 73 This category stands apart
from the general rule that Congress cannot "withdraw from
judicial cognizance any matter which, from its nature, is
the subject of a suit at the common law, or in equity, or
admiralty; nor, on the other hand, can it bring under the
its nature, is not a subjudicial power a matter which, from
'74
ject for judicial determination.
The Northern Pipeline Court explained the doctrine as
arising from the principles of sovereign immunity and separation of powers.7 5 The principle of soverign immunity recognizes that the government may attach certain conditions to
its consent to be sued.' Because of this principle, the public
rights doctrine extends only to matters which arise between
the government and persons subject to the constitutional
exercise of authority by the executive and legislative branches. 77 In other words, the presence of the government as a
71. Dynes v. Hoover, 61 U.S. (20 How.) at 79 (1857).
72. Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 102 S.Ct. at 2869
(1982).
73. 59 U.S. (18 How.) at 284.
74. Id.
75. 102 S.Ct. at 2869.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 2869-70.
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party to the action is necessary for application of the public
rights exception.
Adding to the requirement of the government as a party
to the action, the principle of separation of powers recognizes that certain prerogatives are reserved to the executive
and legislative branches and certain powers are given exclusively to the judicial branch. 8 Under the public rights doctrine, therefore, the issue must be one over which the "political branches" have historically exercised exclusive powers
of resolution."9 Further, if the matter is one which has historically been judicially determined, Congress may not remove it from consideration by article III courts.8 0
Unfortunately, the Court, in an opinion otherwise very
free with comment on peripheral issues, did not see fit to
provide a definition of "public rights" or an exhaustive list
of the matters which properly fall within the public rights
exception. Examples cited by the Court are of some help,
however. In Atlas Roofing Co. v. Occupational Safety and
Health Commission,"' the Court held that situations involving public rights were those in which "the Government is
involved in its sovereign capacity under an otherwise valid
statute creating enforceable public rights."82 The Northern
Pipeline Court cited with approval" a list of matters that
fall within the public rights doctrine set out by the Court in
Crowell v. Benson. 4 In that case, the Court stated that "administrative agencies created for the determination of ...
[public rights] matters are found in connection with the
exercise of the congressional power as to interstate and foreign commerce, taxation, immigration, the public lands, public health, the facilities of the post office, pensions and payments to veterans."8 5 In Ex Parte Bakelite Corp. the Court
held that the Court of Claims was properly constituted as a
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.

Id.
Id. at 2870.
Id.
430 U.S. 442 (1977).
Id. at 458.
102 S.Ct. at 2870 n.22.
285 U.S. 22 (1932).
Id. at 51.
279 U.S. 438 (1929).
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legislative court in that it handled matters arising between
the government and others and concerning issues which may
be handled exclusively by executive officers.8 7 This holding
was reaffirmed in Williams v. United States" where the
Court again held that the Court of Claims was a legislative
court and that Congress could therefore reduce the salary
of a judge of that court."9 These examples provide at least
some guidance in determining what issues involve public
rights.
The final requirement outlined by the Court was that
the dispute must not involve private rights."0 Private rights
disputes involve "the liability of one individual to another
under the law as defined"'" and may not be removed from the
cognizance of article III courts. 2 These disputes, according
to the Northern Pipeline Court, "lie at the core of the historically recognized judicial power.19 3 Examples of private
rights include cases between individuals concerning torts,
contracts, and property disputes. 4
In summary, the public rights exception extends to matters which (1) arise between the government and persons
subject to the constitutional exercise of its legislative or
executive authority, (2) historically have been determined by
the executive and legislative branches of the government, and
(3) are not private rights disputes. While the analysis provided by the Northern Pipeline Court is somewhat unclear,
it does give better guidance than was available prior to this
case.
Rejected Exceptions
1) Inherent Power of Congress. An argument advanced
by appellants was that because Congress has the constituId. at 458.
289 U.S. 553 (1933).
Id. at 581.
102 S.Ct. at 2870-71.
Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. at 51.
Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 102 S.Ct. at 2871
(1982).
93. Id.
94. Atlas Roofing Co. v. Occupational Safety and Health Review Comm'n, 430
U.S. at 458.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.

https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/land_water/vol18/iss1/8

12

Atkinson, II: Constitutional Law - Article III: A Clear Test for the Constituti

1983

CASE NOTES

325

tional authority to establish uniform bankruptcy laws,"5 it
therefore has the inherent power to establish courts with
jurisdiction over controversies related to bankruptcy."' The
Court did not accept this category as an additional exception.
The main objection expressed by the Court was that this
exception would allow Congress to side-step the article III
limitations in any circumstance where it decided that nonarticle III courts would enhance the application of its specific
article I powers. 7 In the Court's language, such an exception "could effectviely eviscerate the constitutional guarantee of an independent Judicial Branch of the Federal Government.""8
2) Adjunct Courts. Another argument advanced by appellants was that the bankruptcy courts were properly constituted as adjuncts to the district courts, analogizing them
This arguto administrative agencies and magistrates.
ment was premised on the theory that Congress possesses
the authority to assign certain fact-finding functions to
adjunct adjudicative bodies even in the absence of the power
to establish legislative courts.' 0 The Court has looked favorably on this theory in the past 0 1 and, in Northern Pipeline,
stated that such adjuncts do not represent an exception to
article III because the "essential attributes of judicial power"
are retained in the article III court. 102
The two major precedents in this area are Crowell v.
Benson,"°8 a case involving fact-finding by an administrative
agency, and United States v. Raddatz,"' which upheld the
95. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 4. This clause provides that Congress shall have
the power "[t]o establish an uniform Rule of Naturalization, and uniform
Laws on the subject of Bankruptcies throughout the United States."
96. Brief for the United States at 14, Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. MaraU.S -... , 102 S.Ct. 2858 (1982).
thon Pipe Line Co..........
97. 102 S.Ct. at 2872-73.
98. Id. at 2873.
99. Brief for the United States, supra note 96, at 11-13, 37-45.
100. Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 102 S.Ct. at 2875
(1982).
101. United States v. Raddatz, 447 U.S. 667 (1980) (upholding the 1978 Federal
Magistrates Act); See also Atlas Roofing Co. v. Occupational Safety and
Health Review Comm'n, 430 U.S. 442 (1977); Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S.
22 (1932).
102. 102 S.Ct. at 2875.
103. 285 U.S. 22 (1932).
104. 447 U.S. 667 (1980).
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1978 Federal Magistrates Act. The Northern Pipeline Court
distilled two propositions from these cases to use as bases
for determining the extent to which non-article III bodies
may be given traditionally judicial functions. The first principle is that Congress has "substantial discretion" to dictate
how an issue will be adjudicated when the issue is based on
substantive federal rights created by Congress.0 5 Second,
the discretion of Congress under the first principle is limited
in that the adjudicatory scheme created by Congress must
leave the "essential attributes of judicial power" with the
article III court. 00 The test of whether these essential attributes are left with the article III court is to determine which
body has the power to make the final or ultimate decision in
07
the matter."
By applying these two propositions to the Bankruptcy
Courts the Northern Pipeline Court reached the conclusion
that they are not proper district court adjuncts. The Court
stated that the first principle allows Congress to assign factfinding functions to non-article III adjuncts only when the
adjuncts are considering federal substantive rights created
by Congress. The Bankruptcy Courts' jurisdiction fails this
test in two respects. First, the Bankruptcy Reform Act was
passed pursuant to the constitutional power of Congress to
create uniform bankruptcy laws. It therefore has some charThis arguacteristics of a constitutionally created right.'
ment probably proves too much in that all acts of Congress
are in furtherance of constitutional grants of power. More
pertinent to this case, by giving the bankruptcy courts jurisdiction over all matters "related to" proceedings under title
11, Congress has allowed non-article III court determinations
of purely state-created rights.'0 9
The Court's analysis under the second principle also led
to its conclusion that the grant of jurisdiction to the bankruptcy courts was unconstitutional. Five factors identified
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.

102
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

S.Ct. at 2876.
at 2876-77.
at 2877.
at 2878.
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by the Court show that the essential attributes of judicial
power have been vested in a non-article III court. First, the
Court again noted the broad jurisdiction granted over all
proceedings related to cases arising under title 11. Second,
all of the jurisdiction granted to the district courts under
the Act is transferred to the bankruptcy courts. Third, the
bankruptcy courts exercise all ordinary powers of the district
courts. Fourth, the judgments of the bankruptcy courts may
be set aside by the district courts only if they are clearly
erroneous. Finally, bankruptcy courts may issue final judgments which are binding and enforceable. 1 '
Application of the Approved Exceptions to the
Bankruptcy Courts
The Court had no difficulty disposing of the first two
exceptions, territorial courts and military courts-martial.
Clearly, the bankruptcy courts do not resemble either of
these exceptions."1 While the question of whether bankruptcy courts fit within the public rights doctrine is a closer
one, the Court had little more difficulty disposing of that
exception. The Court stated that the right to recover contract damages is unquestionably in the nature of a private
right or "the liability of one individual to another under the
law as defined.""' 2 Finally, the Northern Pipeline Court held
that "[i]n sum, Art. III bars Congress from establishing
related to
courts to exercise jurisdiction over all Mmatters
3
those arising under the bankruptcy laws.
THE DISSENT
Because a majority of the members of the Court could

not agree on either the issue to be decided or the analysis to
be used, the dissent takes on added importance. Justice
White provided an extensive historical analysis of the development of the law in the area of article III courts versus nonarticle III courts, as the foundation for his proposed test.""
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at
at
at
at
at

2878-79.
2871.
2870-71 (quoting Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. at 51 (1932)).
2874.
2889-93 (White, J., dissenting).
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He analyzed the same cases relied upon by the plurality, but
reached different conclusions. Of particular significance is
his reading of Crowell v. Benson, cited by the plurality in
support of the contention that private rights may not be
adjudicated in a non-article III court.'15 In that case, he
argued, the Court approved the non-article III administrative scheme for determination of maritime compensation
claims even though it recognized the right involved was "the
liability of one individual to another under the law as defined.""' As noted earlier, this is the classic definition of a
private right.
Following his detailed historical analysis, Justice White
contended that Chief Justice Vinson, dissenting in National
Mutual Insurance Co. v. Tidewater Transfer Co.," 7 and Justice Harlan, writing for the plurality in Glidden Co. v.
Zdanok,1 8 pointed the way to the correct conclusion, which
was that there is no difference between the subject matter
jurisdiction that Congress may assign to article I courts
and that assigned to article III courts by the Constitution.11
Based on this conclusion, Justice White went on to propose
that the proper way in which to determine whether Congress
may assign a given issue to a non-article III court is to balance the values expressed by article III against "competing
constitutional values and legislative responsibilities."'' 0 The
Court, he said, should weigh the strength of the legislative
interest in establishing the non-article III body against the
extent to which the legislative scheme undermines article
111.121

Applying that test, Justice White stated that where appellate review by an article III court is available and where
115. 102 S.Ct. at 2878-79.
116. Id. at 2891 (quoting Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. at 51 (1932)).
117. 337 U.S. 582 (1949). The Court in this case held that federal courts may
be given jurisdiction over suits between citizens of the District of Columbia
and citizens of a State. The plurality's position that Congress could assign
article I powers to article III courts outside the District of Columbia was
rejected by a majority. Chief Justice Vinson's dissent considered whether
article I courts could be given article III powers. Id. at 626 (Vinson, C.J.,
dissenting).
118. 370 U.S. 530 (1962). Here the Court held that the Court of Claims and the
Court of Customs and Patent Appeals were article III courts.
119. 102 S.Ct. at 2892-93 (White, J., dissenting).
120. Id. at 2893 (White, J., dissenting).
121. Id. at 2894 (White, J., dissenting).

https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/land_water/vol18/iss1/8

16

Atkinson, II: Constitutional Law - Article III: A Clear Test for the Constituti

1983

CASE NOTES

329

the proposed article I courts deal with issues of little political
interest, the requirements of separation of powers are substantially met.'22 The system of bankruptcy courts created
by the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 satisfied these criteria, according to Justice White.' 23 Finally, he contended
that the ends Congress sought to accomplish were at least
as compelling as the ends found to be compelling in Palmore
v. United States.'24 The dissenters read Palmore as standing
for the proposition that article I courts may be created if
justified by a strong legislative interest in furthering one
of Congress's constitutionally assigned responsibilities.' 5 Because in their view the creation of article I bankruptcy courts
survives this balancing test, the dissent would "defer to the
12
congressional judgment" and uphold the challenged statute. 1
CRITIQUE

There are both positive and negative aspects of the analysis and effects of Northern Pipeline. The most outstanding
negative effect of the decision, of course, was the confusion
resulting from its holding that the bankruptcy courts had
been given an unconstitutional grant of jurisdiction. Attorneys handling bankruptcy cases were faced with difficult decisions on whether to file new actions in the bankruptcy
courts, in the district courts, or not at all. This confusion
was largely eliminated, however, by the interim rules proposed by the Judicial Conference of the United States on
September 23, 1982.127 Congress must cure the defects pres122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 2895 (White, J., dissenting).
Id. at 2894 (White, J., dissenting).
Id. at 2896 (White, J., dissenting).
Letter from William E. Foley, Director of the Administrative Office of the
United States Courts, to all Judges of the United States Courts of Appeal,
United States District Courts, and United States Bankruptcy Courts (Sept.
27, 1982), reprinted in West's Bankruptcy Newsletter, 22 B.R. No. 3, Adv.
Sh. 21 (1982). The rules were formulated on the premise that Northern
Pipeline did not invalidate sections 1471 (a) and 1471 (b). The purpose of
the rules is to provide a "measure by which district courts may delegate
many of their bankruptcy powers to bankruptcy judges" during the period
of time between the expiration of the stay of judgment and passage of new
legislation by Congress. Id. at 22. Mr. Foley describes the procedure established by the rules as follows:
Under the Rule, all bankruptcy matters are initially referred to
a bankruptcy judge. In proceedings not involving a final judgment
in a Marathon claim, the bankruptcy judge may enter orders and
judgments that become effective immediately, subject to district
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ent in section 1471. It is hard to predict the solution Congress will choose. As pointed out in Chief Justice Burger's
dissent, Congress need not completely restructure the system
of bankruptcy adjudication but can effect a cure of the defects by simply removing ancillary common law actions from
the purview of the bankruptcy courts."' It appears that reconstituting the courts as article III courts would be an
equally permissible solution, however. The choice of cure
will obviously have a great impact on whether cases filed in
the bankruptcy courts but not yet considered will have to be
refiled in other courts.
A critique of the opinion itself must begin with a discussion of the issue decided by the Court. The plurality
opinion stated the issue before it as "whether the Bankruptcy
Act of 1978 violates the command of Art. III, that the judicial power of the United States must be vested in courts
whose judges enjoy the protections and safeguards specified
in that Article."' 9 Read without reference to the underlying facts of the case, the plurality's statement of the
issue could lead to two possible conclusions. The first is
that the grant of jurisdiction to the bankruptcy courts is
extremely narrow and the pertinent case requires the exercise of all of that grant. The second possibility is that the
issues of the case are so broad and varied that they require
the exercise of all aspects of a broad grant of jurisdiction.
Clearly, neither of these possible conclusions is correct. This
case is one in which the jurisdictional challenge is narrow:
court review if requested by a party. With respect to final judgments in Marathon claims, the bankruptcy judge prepares recommended findings and conclusions and a proposed judgment. A
district judge then reviews the recommendation and enters a
judgment. Where the bankruptcy judge certifies that circumstances rquire, an order or judgment entered by a bankruptcy
judge will be confirmed by a district judge even if no objection
is filed.

The district court will provide expedited review or confirma-

Id.

tion of any order, judgment, or proposed judgment where the
bankruptcy judge certifies prompt review is necessary.
(citations omitted).

The United States District Court for the District of Wyoming has adopted
the proposed rules in their entirety. Telephone interview with Joyce Harris,

Clerk, United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Wyoming (Jan.

19, 1983).
Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 102 S.Ct. at 2882
(1982) (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
129. Id. at 2867.

128.
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whether a non-article III court may decide a claim based on
state law.1"' The statutory grant of jurisdiction to the bankruptcy courts, on the other hand, is very broad. Both the
concurring and dissenting Justices concluded that the plurality had engaged in an impermissibly broad analysis and
had reached an impermissibly broad holding.'
That the Court did address such a broad issue provided
some very definite benefits, however. Without such a wideranging analysis, the issue of article III courts versus nonarticle III courts would be as confusing and unpredictable
as it was before the decision. The decision has great significance because of the very fact that the Court did render such
a broad opinion when a narrow one would have sufficed. The
plurality wished to provide broad guidelines for non-article
III courts; it used the narrow issues of Northern Pipeline to
accomplish that goal. Combining this factor with the use of
the doctrine of separation of powers as the basis of decision
leads to the conclusion that Northern Pipeline is a very significant case.
The opinion's most important feature is the "checklist"
provided for analyzing the constitutionality of non-article
III courts. As the concurring opinion pointed out, the plurality has stated a general proposition and "three tidy exceptions."' 32 The general proposition is that matters requiring the exercise of the judicial power of the United States
must normally be submitted to an artcile III court for adjudication. The three exceptions to this proposition are instances in which the Court has recognized "exceptional"
powers belonging to Congress as granted by either the Constitution or historical consensus.'33 The categories embraced
by the three exceptions are territorial courts, courts-martial
and other exercises of Congress' plenary powers, and public
rights issues.' If the jurisdictional grant to a non-article
III adjudicatory body includes cases outside of these three
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at
at
at
at
at

2881 (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
2881 (Rehnquist, J., concurring), at 2882 (Burger, C.J., dissenting),
2881 (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
2868.
2868-69.
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areas, the grant is necessarily unconstitutional. The simplicity of this test is especially appealing in light of the utter
confusion previously existing in this area.
One hesitates to criticize a decision which simplifies a
difficult legal issue, but the dissent raised some serious questions as to the validity of the plurality's analysis leading to
its new "test" which must be discussed. First, the dissent
relied heavily on the argument that the Bankruptcy Reform
Act did not expand the jurisdiction of the bankruptcy courts
nearly as much as the plurality believed.'
The dissent argued that the new courts must be constitutional since the
bankruptcy referees exercised much the same jurisdiction
under the Bankruptcy Act of 1898. Assuming that the dissent's premise is valid, a questionable assumption at best,
the plurality pointed out that the Court has never explicitly
held that the power exercised by the bankruptcy referees was
constitutional.' As a basis for its contention that the Bankruptcy Court's jurisdiction was no greater than that previously exercised by the referees, the dissent relied on Katchen v. Landy,"' wherein the Court held that a bankruptcy
referee had the authority to allow or disallow claims. 8 The
plurality argued, however, that this case did not address the
article III issue and, more signifciantly, was decided before
adoption of the 1973 bankruptcy rules which greatly changed
the standard by which the district courts reviewed the findings of the referees. 8
The dissent also contended that bankruptcy cases have
always involved questions of state law which must necessarily be resolved in order to decide the existence and validity
of claims against the bankrupt and that therefore, the Act's
grant of jurisdiction allowing the courts to decide state law
questions was constitutional. 4 0 Further, the only effect of
extending jurisdiction to state law claims involving third
parties is to grant in personam rather than in rem jurisdic135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.

Id. at 2884-86 (White, J., dissenting).
Id. at 2876, n.31.
382 U.S. 323 (1966).
Id. at 336.
102 S.Ct. at 2876, n.31.
Id. at 2884-85 (White, J., dissenting).
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tion according to the dissent.14' This argument has great
logical appeal and is probably a more accurate statement of
the situation than that given by the plurality. The problem
with the argument is that it is not dispositive of the issues
presented in Northern Pipeline. Even if the plurality conceded that a non-article III court could properly decide matters based on state law, the bankruptcy courts would still
not fit into any of the recognized exceptions. The dissent
erred in basing its criticism of the plurality opinion in this
area on its own definition of the issue rather than the issue
addressed by the plurality. Any argument against a position
taken by another party is fatally flawed if it changes the
premise used by that party in arriving at its position. The
dissent could have properly attacked the premise, which it
later did, or, without changing the premise, the conclusion
arrived at by the plurality.
Another argument of the dissent was that the plurality
had misapplied the doctrine of separation of powers. 4 ' Simply stated, the contention was that state law claims, if left
to the state courts, would be heard by state judges; therefore, there would be little intrusion upon the domain of the
article III courts should this type of claim be assigned to
non-article III courts.14 While the dissent was correct in
stating that the plurality did not address this question, it
overstated the importance of the issue in determining the
outcome of the case. First, the plurality defined the issue
of the case in broader terms than did the dissent. Also,
that a particular claim is based on state law does not diminish the importance of separation of powers. The party making a state law claim in federal court should have the assurance that his claim is being decided free from legislative or
executive influence and pressure to the same extent as a
party making a constitutional claim. Neither claim is based
on a Congressionally created right, therefore neither claim
is properly subject to the substantive or procedural influence
of Congress.
141. Id. at 2885 (White, J., dissenting).
142. Id.
143. Id.
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CONCLUSION

Northern Pipeline represents an attempt by four Justices to bring order to a confusing area of the law by formulating definite categories of exceptions to the general rule
that the judicial power of the United States may only be
exercised by article III courts. By identifying the categories
of territorial courts, courts-martial, and public rights adjudication as the only true exceptions to the dictates of article
III, the plurality provides counsel and Congress with a tool
with which to measure the constitutionality of a given legislative scheme. While the historical precedents may not have
been applied perfectly, one has to question whether their perfect application would be desirable, given the state of the
law in this area prior to this case.
The test proposed by the dissent, on the other hand,
appears to be very unpredictable in its application and does
nothing to clarify the issues. When weighing the strength
of the legislative interest in establishing a non-article III
adjudicative body against the values expressed by article
III, almost any conclusion could be reached. The test does
not provide an objective way to measure the strength of the
legislative interest, as indeed it could not.
The concurrence, finally, went no further than to hold
that the grant of jurisdiction giving the Bankruptcy Court
the power to decide Northern's state law-based claims was
unconstitutional. Whether the Court will apply the analysis
of the plurality in future cases is, of course, not certain.
One only hopes that either Justice Rehnquist or Justice
O'Connor, or both, would recognize the overriding positive
aspects of the analysis and vote with the plurality.
THOMAS E. ATKINSON, II
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